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TWO MOVEMENTS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SYMPHONY:
AKIIIL REED AMAR'S THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Kurt T. Lash*
A remarkable effort is afoot to justify American constitutional
law at the end of the twentieth century. Ground zero in this
effort is Yale Law School, and the principle architects are pro-
fessors Akhil Reed Amar and Bruce Ackerman. Together, these
scholars are calling for a reevaluation of commonly accepted
doctrines with the goal of grounding judicial review and consti-
tutional interpretation on the principles of popular sovereignty.
What makes the effort remarkable is its emphasis on political
morality, as opposed to the attainment of a particular doctrinal
end. Take, for example, Amar's explanation of his purpose in
writing The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction.' He
writes, "this book has aimed to explain how today's judges and
lawyers have often gotten it right without quite realizing
why."2 For a book with over 300 pages of text and 942 foot-
notes, that may seem a rather modest goal. If, in fact, judges
and lawyers have been getting it right, what is the problem?
The problem is one of political legitimacy. Beginning with
freedom of speech in 1925, the Supreme Court has "incorporat-
ed" most of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. However just the result, the
Court's explanation of its actions as a matter of constitutional
interpretation has been less than convincing. Acting under the
doctrine of "substantive due process"--the phrase itself the
subject of withering criticism-the Court has never embraced
one particular test for determining which provisions in the Bill
express "fundamental" rights, and are therefore incorporated, or
* Professor of Law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angel-
es. B.A., 1989, Whitman College; J.D., 1992, Yale Law School. I would like to thank
my colleague Larry Solum for his generous comments on a draft of this essay.
1. AKHIL REED MAIt, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
2. Id. at 307.
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whether there are other nontextual rights of equal status with
incorporated rights.3 Only one Justice has attempted to ground
incorporation on the intentions of the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment,4 but his historical analysis was roundly
criticized in the literature5 and his theory of incorporation has
never been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lack-
ing a textual mandate, a coherent theory, or, until recently,
convincing historical support, one is tempted to conclude that
the incorporation project is less a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation than it is a striking example of judicial lawmaking.
But however problematic as a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation, it may seem quixotic to challenge incorporation at
this late date. Not only is there no realistic chance of the Court
abandoning the doctrine, most of us-including Akhil Amar-
appreciate the result. Who wants to return to the days when
states were free to abridge fundamental freedoms like religion,
speech and press? Nevertheless, even if one applauds the end,
the means by which the Bill of Rights are incorporated against
the states raises critical questions regarding the role of the
Court in a constitutional democracy. Hidden behind this seem-
ing fait accompli lie fundamental questions of self-governance
and it is this issue, popular sovereignty, that drives the work of
Amar and Ackerman. Together, they seek to explain how and
why our modern Constitution reflects the considered will of the
people, and by doing so, inspire a renewed appreciation of each
citizen's role in shaping fundamental law. Akhil Amar focuses
on 1868 and the impact of the Reconstruction amendments;
Bruce Ackerman grapples with 1937 and the impact of the New
Deal. In the end, I will argue that one cannot be understood
without the other.
Part I of this paper addresses Amar's analysis of the original
Bill of Rights and his conclusion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to change the substantive meaning of the
original Bill. I will conclude that Amar's account, in its essen-
tials, is surely correct: The original Bill of Rights expressed
3. In his book, Amar discusses the approaches of Justices Frankfurter, Black,
and Brennan. See id. at 139. Amar's "refined incorporation" is yet another approach,
and the most plausible to date.
4. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 app. (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
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values of majoritarianism and federalism. The First Amend-
ment in particular protected state autonomy to regulate matters
like religion, speech, and press. This states' rights interpreta-
tion, however, changed in the early decades of the nineteenth
century, and ultimately, the Bill was reinterpreted by abolition-
ists and Reconstruction Republicans to stand as an expression
of individual freedoms.
Part II addresses the issue of nontextual rights and the rele-
vance of the New Deal. Although Amar believes that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause may incorporate nontextual as well
as textual liberties, he downplays the main barrier to such an
interpretation: the Supreme Court's rejection of "Lochnering"
and the impact of the New Deal "switch in time." I will argue
that the New Deal is critical to understanding whether, and
how, the original vision of the Fourteenth Amendment was
modified by later constitutional innovation. If, as Amar's col-
league Ackerman argues, the New Deal was a constitutional
moment, it is possible that the Court's "switch in time" both
expanded government power and, at the same time, restricted
the power of the Supreme Court to invoke nontextual rights to
strike down the duly enacted laws of the people's representa-
tives.
I. THE FOUNDING
In both popular and legal culture, there is a lingering
belief in a constitutional big bang: the idea that all of our most
cherished constitutional values sprang into existence in a single
moment at the Founding. Even though most concede the origi-
nal document contained a number of flaws (the embrace of
slavery among them), most errors have been removed and no
longer obscure the truly libertarian vision of the Founders. This
creation myth' is not limited to the legally uninformed: The
modern Supreme Court often supports its decisions by relying
on the original intent of the Founding generation.7
6. Bruce Ackerman calls this the "Bicentennial Myth." See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (executive immunity); Printz
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (commerce power); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (state power to impose term limits on federal repre-
sentatives); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (speech); Everson
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In the first half of his book, Akhil Amar explodes the myth.
Following the general interpretive categories of Philip Bobbitt8
(and adding an extra category of his own), Amar considers the
text, structure, and history of the original Bill of Rights and
reveals a document solidly grounded on the theory of federal-
ism.9 The first ten amendments to the Constitution were never
intended to restrict state power. To the contrary, they were in-
tended to placate Anti-Federalist criticisms by guaranteeing
that the regulation of certain subjects would remain a matter of
local, not national control.
Amar's approach in this first half of the book itself stands as
a significant contribution to the study of constitutional law. In
most law schools, the Constitution is dissected and its various
parts distributed to various classes for individual study. The
first three articles are the subject of a course on the powers of
government ("Con Law r), the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are the focus of a course on individual liberties ("Con
Law II"), and the Fourth through Sixth Amendments are stud-
ied in criminal procedure. Other provisions receive passing
mention in other courses; some provisions are not studied at
all.' ° However helpful this approach may be to doctrinal mas-
tery, it has the inevitable effect of obscuring the underlying
structure of the document.
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (establishment). There are many others.
8. See generally PHILIP BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1982).
9. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (emphasizing the Federalist Bill of Rights). Other
authors have made similar points with regard to specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CON-
STITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (examining the Religion Clause).
10. For example, despite its prominent place in both the Bill of Rights and popu-
lar culture, the Second Amendment is rarely addressed in law reviews and probably
not at all in most constitutional law courses. See Lewis H. LaRue, Constitutional Law
and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 373, 375 (1987) ("[Ihe second amend-
ment is not taken seriously by most scholars . .. ."). For interesting reevaluations of
the Second Amendment, see Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998), Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second
Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831 (1998), and Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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Rejecting this piecemeal approach, Amar reveals how the first
ten amendments were meant to work alongside Section 9 of
Article I. By comparing the amendments to the original Con-
stitution, and comparing them to each other, Amar finds the
twin themes of federalism and majoritarianism repeated again
and again. By allowing text to interpret text, Amar reconciles
the vision of the original Constitution with the Anti-Federalist
concerns of state autonomy and presents the reader with a rare
vision of the law of the original Constitution. This is marvelous
work and it deserves a place in constitutional law courses.
Although Amar's account demolishes the idea that our mod-
em libertarian Bill of Rights reflects the intentions of those
who ratified the Clause in 1791, the Founding is not the end of
the story. In the decades between 1791 and 1868, the meaning
of the Bill of Rights shifted from an expression of federalism to
one of individual liberty. Conceding the formal correctness of
cases like Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,'2 in which the Su-
preme Court interpreted the Bill of Rights to apply only against
the federal government, the so-called "Barron-contrarians" nev-
ertheless insisted that the words expressed fundamental liber-
ties that ought to be protected from the actions of the states. 3
This new reading of the Bill, Amar argues, ultimately gained
constitutional status through the adoption of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By establishing early in the book the Federalist origins of the
original Constitution, Amar sets up his theory regarding the
impact of the Fourteenth Amendment and what Amar calls
"refined incorporation."'4 For example, Amar believes that
some of the provisions in the original Bill may have been so
uniquely Federalist in nature that, even after Reconstruction,
they remain inappropriate candidates for incorporation.'5 The
11. Literally. Madison originally proposed placing protections for speech and press
in Article I, Section 9. See James Madison, Proposal to the House (June 8, 1789),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 83 (Neil Cogan ed., 1997).
12. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
13. According to Barron, the Bill of Rights in general and the Fifth Amendment
in particular restricted only federal, not state, government. "Barron-contrarians"
claimed that, despite Barron, the Bill should be understood as declaring rights pre-
existing the Constitution. See AMLAR, supra note 1, at 154-55.
14. See id. at 218.
15. See id. at 215.
1999] 489
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obvious example here would be the Tenth Amendment. 6 More
controversially, Amar distinguishes the "bland" phrasing of the
Establishment Clause ("Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment") from other First Amendment provisions that
speak in terms of freedoms and rights (the "free exercise of
religion" and the "freedom" of speech and press)." This hyper-
Federalist clause may have placed greater restrictions on
Congress's implied powers than the rest of the First Amend-
ment. For example, Amar speculates that, although Congress
may have had both the power and the responsibility to protect
political speech in the states, the Establishment Clause
would have prevented any similar interference with state reli-
gious establishments. Since "privileges or immunities" incorpo-
rates personal freedoms, not structural guarantees of state
autonomy, Amar argues that refined incorporation may include
the Free Exercise Clause, but filter out the Establishment
Clause."
Once Amar concedes the hyper-Federalist aspect of the Estab-
lishment Clause, however, there is a domino effect regarding
congressional power over other First Amendment subjects that
Amar does not explore. Presumably, the more rigorous the state
establishment (for example, regulating public and private reli-
gious ceremonies), the greater the impact on the free exercise of
religion. Nevertheless, if Congress is truly prohibited from in-
terfering with state establishments, then Congress would be
powerless to protect the free exercise rights of individual reli-
gious dissenters. 0 For the same reason, the Establishment
Clause would severely restrict, if not prevent altogether, con-
16. It is impossible to incorporate against the states a clause that reserves power
to the states.
17. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 41.
18. Under the Republican Guarantee Clause of Article IV. See id.
19. See generally id. at 246-47.
20. One could, I suppose, imagine a free exercise claim that did not implicate
religious establishments. For example, Congress might act to protect religious exercise
from the impact of a religiously neutral law. Aside from creating the anomaly of en-
abling Congress to act upon the lesser but not the greater abridgment of religious
freedom, this approach would ascribe to the Founders an interpretation of free exer-
cise that Akhil Amar believes unwarranted by the historical record. See id. at 43 &
327 n.96. I agree with Amar that free exercise at the Founding did not include the
right to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. See Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
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gressional efforts to protect freedom of speech.2 In a time
when state governments were actively regulating religious "exer-
cise and limiting public office to those of particular religious
beliefs, it is hard to see how religion would not play a major
role in dissenting political opinion-and in fact, it played a
major role22. To the extent that political and religious expres-
sion intertwined, state regulation of such speech would be im-
mune from federal protection.
In fact, the Founders saw no distinction between the kinds of
restraints imposed by the various provisions of the First
Amendment.' For example, according to Thomas Jefferson,
no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or
freedom of the press, being delegated to the United States
by the Constitution ... all lawful powers respecting the
same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states,
or to the people; ... [The Tenth Amendment] thus also []
guarded against all abridgment, by the United States, of
the freedom of religious principles and exercises, and re-
tained to themselves the right of protecting the same.'
Likewise, according to James Madison, the "liberty of conscience
and freedom of the press were equally and completely exempted
from all authority whatever of the united states"' Just to
drive the point home, Madison expressly criticized those who
tried to drive an interpretive wedge between the restrictions of
the Establishment Clause and the rest of the First Amend-
ment.
21. Even if, under the Republican Guarantee Clause, Congress originally had an
obligation to protect political speech in the states, that Clause, along with the rest of
the original Constitution, was restricted by the adoption of the First Amendment.
22. See generally Lash, supra note 20.
23. For a more thorough review of the evidence regarding original federal power
over First Amendment subjects, see Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion,
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069 (1998).
24. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTUTON 131-32 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (em-
phasis added).
25. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDER' CONSTITUTION 141, 146 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987). For many other examples, see Lash, supra note 23.
26. According to Madison's 1800 Report on the Virginia Resolutions:
For if Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided they do
not abridge it, because it is said only "they shall not abridge it," and is
not said "they shall make no law respecting it," the analogy of reasoning
1999] 491
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But recognizing the common limitation placed upon Congress
in regard to all First Amendment subjects is not to quarrel
with Amar's basic point. Rather, it is to strengthen it. Amar
wants to turn our attention away from the Founding and to-
wards the Fourteenth Amendment period as the source of mod-
ern libertarian rights such as religion, speech, and the press.
Asserting that the entire original First Amendment was hyper-
Federalist only dramatizes the shift in public rhetoric that
occurred between 1791 and 1868. This is where Amar's analysis
of the abolitionists and the triumph of the "Barron-contrarians"
is masterful.
A number of the most influential Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment expected the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
protect many of the freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights against
state action. The real question is how, not whether, the Fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect the per-
sonal liberties of United States citizens.
Incorporating the Establishment Clause
In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment
Clause restrictions applied to the states as well as to the feder-
al government." Although the case involved a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the Court based its decision on the
separationist views of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson,'
rather than the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Five
years later, in 1962, the Court relied on the newly incorporated
right to strike down teacher-led prayer in public schools.' The
next year, the Court extended this holding to Bible reading.0
By this time, however, legal historians had produced evidence
which called into question incorporation of the Bill of Rights in
general and the Establishment Clause in particular."' Despite
is conclusive that Congress may regulate and even abridge the free exer-
cise of religion, provided they do not prohibit it, and is not said, "they
shall make no law respecting, or no law abridging it."
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 141, 146-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
27. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1947).
28. See id.
29. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
30. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23
(1963).
31. See generally, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rsv. 5 (1949); Alfred M. Meyer, The Blaine
[Vol. 33:485492
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public outcry and scholarly dissent, in 1963, Justice Clark dis-
missed anyone who challenged the "history, logic and efficacy"
of establishment incorporation.32 "Such contentions," huffed
Justice Clark, "seem entirely untenable and of value only as
academic exercises."33
In the next two decades, the Court would produce an ever
more Byzantine doctrine regarding forbidden state establish-
ments, and the trickle of scholarship criticizing the Court's
historical justification for establishment incorporation would
become a steady stream.' By now, there is general agreement
among legal historians who study the Establishment Clause
that, originally, the Clause protected state establishments as
much as it forbade federal establishments.' In other words,
Amar's general point regarding the original Bill of Rights ap-
plies in spades to the original Establishment Clause.
So overwhelming is the evidence regarding the Federalist
Establishment Clause, that Amar singles out this Clause as an
inappropriate candidate for incorporation. According to Amar,
refined incorporation looks for those provisions in the original
Constitution (both in and outside the Bill of Rights) that pro-
tect personal property, personal security, and bodily liberty. 6
Under this approach, some provisions clearly qualify for incor-
poration whereas others, like the Establishment Clause, might
not. In support of this view, Amar points out that a number of
Fourteenth Amendment Framers quoted other provisions in the
Bill of Rights as exemplifying "privileges or immunities" while
leaving out the Establishment Clause."
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARv. L. REv. 939 (1951); F. William O'Brien,
The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137 (1963); Joseph M. Snee, Reli-
gious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371.
32. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217.
33. Id.
34. See William K. Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism
and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 1191, 1210 (1990); Michael A.
Paulson, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 314 (1986); Snee,
supra note 31, at 407; Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause:
A Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1700, 1703 (1992). See generally GERARD V.
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); SMITH, supra note 9.
35. See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISIMENT CLAUSE 95 (1986); SMITH, supra
note 9 at 22; Lash, supra note 9, at 1091 (1996); Leitzau, supra note 34, at 1199;
Note, supra note 34.
36. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 227.
37. Amar also cites Justice Harlan's dissent in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
1999] 493
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Amar concedes that there is some evidence that the originally
Federalist Establishment Clause eventually came to be inter-
preted as an individual right. For example, in drafting their
own constitutions, states in the nineteenth century sometimes
copied the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses word-for-
word."8 Amar believes this reflects an evolving understanding
of the Establishment Clause as a "soft substantive rule," but
still something less than a full "privilege or immunity." Even
though nineteenth century America moved away from tax sup-
ported religious establishments and towards a kind of noncoer-
cive non-sectarian brand of religious establishment, Amar be-
lieves that this reflects an evolved understanding of free exer-
cise rights. Finally, since coercive establishments (under modern
law) would be forbidden under the Free Exercise Clause any-
way, Amar concludes that there is no need to incorporate the
Establishment Clause. 9
But here, Amar may have underplayed the case for establish-
ment incorporation. True, coercive establishments violate both
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The fact that the
clauses overlap somewhat, however, is beside the point. After
all, many constitutional freedoms are redundant." This does
615-16 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Justice Harlan describes a hypothetical
state religious tax in support of a state religious establishment as violating the citi-
zens privilege of the free exercise of religion. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 229. Based
on the fact that the hypothetical included a religious tax (arguably violating free
exercise), and not just a declared state establishment, Amar infers that Harlan has
intuitively filtered out the Establishment Clause.
38. See, e.g., Iowa Const. of 1857, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 552, 552-53 (Ben. Perley Poore ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 2d
ed. 1878).
39. Amar concedes that coercive establishments may violate rights, but notes that
these seem to be textbook examples of "free exercise" cases-noncoercive establish-
ments may not raise the same concerns. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 252. Amar also
notes that there were no noncoercive establishments in the South that would have
triggered concerns by the Reconstruction Republicans. Again, however, Amar has
made the Establishment Clause disappear by defining its core (prohibiting coercive
establishments) as "really" involving free exercise concerns. As noted above, just be-
cause the protections of the two clauses occasionally overlap does not mean the claus-
es are coextensive or that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
incorporate one, but not the other. For a discussion of the establishment issues that
were at play during slavery, see generally Lash, supra note 9. Amar may be right
that, even after incorporation, nothing prevents Utah from declaring itself "The Mor-
mon State." See AmAR, supra note 1, at 254. This, however, goes more towards the
scope of the incorporated Establishment Clause than to whether or not the Clause
was incorporated.
40. A federal law suppressing religious expression arguably falls under at least
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not make it any less likely that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to economize by only incorporating the
fewest necessary amendments. The issue is whether those who
framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed non-
establishment was a privilege or immunity of citizens of the
United States. Although Amar is correct that sometimes the
Framers of the Fourteenth" Amendment left the Establishment
Clause off of the "list" of privileges or immunities,4 at other
times they expressly included the Establishment Clause in their
list of "privileges or immunities." 2 Even when Reconstruction
Republicans did not quote the Establishment Clause, they often
used words or phrases that arguably could include both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.' Finally, none of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment ever stated that
nonestablishment was not a "privilege or immunity" of United
States citizens. The combined weight of state adoption of the
Establishment Clause, express citation by some of the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that southern es-
tablishment of proslavery religion was one of the problems
meant to be remedied by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause,' at the very least, seems to raise a presumption in
favor of establishment incorporation.45
five different constitutional provisions: nonestablishment, free exercise, free speech,
free press, and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
41. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 253.
42. See 2 CONG. REC. 242 app. (1874) (statement of Rep. Norwood); CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 38th
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
43. For example, Henry Wilson sometimes quoted both Religion Clauses, while at
other times he paraphrases the First Amendment as protecting "[fireedom of religious
opinion, freedom of speech and press." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202
(1864). Suppression of religious opinion, of course, can be the result of a coercive
religious establishment. See Ruggles v. New York, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811) (prosecu-
tion for religious blasphemy) ("[Tihe case assumes that we are a Christian people,
and the morality of the country is deeply engrafted upon Christianity."). Similarly,
John Bingham sometimes quoted both religion clauses, while at other times speaking
of the "rights of conscience." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 app. (1871).
Again, prohibiting coercive establishments would be one way to protect the rights of
conscience.
44. For a discussion of the implications of proslavery religious establishments to
the incorporation question, see Lash, supra note 9, at 1136.
45. Amar rejects, as I do, the most commonly cited evidence against incorporation
of the Establishment Clause, the so-called Blaine Amendment. See AMAR, supra note
1, at 254 n.*; Lash, supra note 9, at 1145.
1999] 495
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By filtering out the Establishment Clause and folding its
protections into the Free Exercise Clause, Amar also obscures
alternative readings of the Free Exercise Clause. Although the
Free Exercise Clause could be read to include a protection
against coercive establishments, it is just as plausible that the
Establishment Clause forbids coercive establishments, and the
Free Exercise Clause does something else altogether. For exam-
ple, to mid-nineteenth-century Americans, free exercise may
have included protections against unnecessary, though nondis-
criminatory, governmental burdens.46 Amar notes such an ex-
pansion of free exercise is possible,4' but his argument regard-
ing the Establishment Clause obscures this potentially broader
reading of the Free Exercise Clause.
In fact, popular understanding of both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses underwent dramatic change in the peri-
od between 1789 and 1868. Prior to the adoption of the federal
Constitution, state constitutions contained provisions protecting
the rights of conscience and the free exercise of religion. Those
provisions, however, existed in the context of state religious
establishments.48 State free exercise clauses thus expressed the
principle of "religious toleration," not religious freedom: The
state had power to promote and protect religion but guaranteed
a minimum level of freedom for religions not threatening the
religion or morality of the state.49 When states recommended
adding something like their free exercise clauses to the federal
Constitution, it made sense to add something like the Estab-
lishment Clause (something without counterpart in the states).
This ensured that the Free Exercise Clause would not be read
at a federal level the same way that similar provisions were
read in the states-as expressions of government responsibility
to promote and protect religion. Thus, in the initial period of
the republic, the two clauses stood as twin guardians of a sin-
gle proposition: The federal government had no power to regu-
late the subject of religion. Under this unitary Federalist read-
ing, there was little reason to distinguish the two clauses. The
subject was foreclosed from federal cognizance.
46. See generally Lash, supra note 20.
47. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 256.
48. For a list of free exercise guarantees placed alongside of religious establish-
ment provisions, see Lash, supra note 23, at 1101 n.112.
49. See id. at 1069.
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In the decades just prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, states began to embrace the Establish-
ment Clause as an expression of individual freedom. As I men-
tioned above, state constitutions adopted both the federal Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses word for word.' State
courts began to reinterpret state law to follow the principle of
separation of church and state and often cited the federal First
Amendment as an expression of the full and free rights of con-
science-and a rejection of the principle of toleration.5' As the
Establishment Clause came to be read as a substantive liberty,
the Free Exercise Clause also broke free from its original Fed-
eralist moorings, and was occasionally cited as justifying federal
action in support of religious freedom.52
By folding protections against coercive establishments into
the Free Exercise Clause, Amar misses this dramatic reinter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause and its implications for
free exercise. At the time of the original Bill of Rights, "free
exercise" in the states amounted to no more than "religious
toleration--a pro-majoritarian doctrine that is unlikely to have
included religious exemptions for dissenting religious minorities.
Yoked as it was to the general idea of government power over
religion, free exercise could not emerge as an independent free-
dom until the rise of nonestablishment and the rejection of the
idea that free exercise is dependent on the "toleration" of the
majority.53
By the Reconstruction Era, the two clauses had begun to
separate. New readings of the Establishment Clause created
"interpretive space" for the Free Exercise Clause. Whether or
not the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed free
50. See IOWA CONST. OF 1857, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 552, 552-53 (Ben. Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) (stating that "the general
assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof); see also CONST. OF THE STATE OF DESERET, art. VIII, § 3
(1849), reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TIONS, 375, 380 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979) [hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCU-
MENTS] (Deseret was refused admission to the United States by Congress and incor-
porated into the Territory of Utah); CONST. OF JEFFERSON TERRITORY, art. I, § 3
(1859), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 18.
51. See generally Lash, supra note 9, at 1105-1118.
52. See Lash, supra note 23, at 1137-42.
53. See Lash, supra note 9, at 1130 n.219.
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exercise occasionally required exemptions from generally appli-
cable laws is a matter for historical debate.' The main point,
though, is that both clauses by 1868 were read separately and
were commonly regarded as fundamental liberties on par with
speech and press. To fold establishment protections into the
Free Exercise Clause, then, is to miss what nineteenth-century
Americans meant when they distinguished the privilege of free
exercise from the immunity from religious establishments.
This, however, addresses only a small point with regard to
the Religion Clauses. Akhil Amar has set the benchmark for
future discussions of incorporated textual freedoms. If the Bill
of Rights may legitimately be applied against the states, it
must be as a matter of Reconstruction, not Founding intent.
Just because one might disagree with Amar's choice of what is
incorporated and what is not does not undermine his basic
point regarding the legitimacy of incorporation. Most important-
ly, Amar has made a clear case for focusing on Reconstruction,
not the Founding, if we want to understand the intended mean-
ing of incorporated liberties.
But even though Amar successfully introduces a new move-
ment to our constitutional symphony, the work remains unfin-
ished. Just as nineteenth-century America reshaped the Con-
stitution of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, it is possible
that the twentieth century has played its own role in shaping
the privileges or immunities of United States citizens.
II. THE NEW DEAL
According to Amar's theory of refined incorporation, "privileg-
es or immunities" may include more than just certain personal
freedoms listed in the text of the first eight amendments to the
Constitution.5 For this reason, Amar criticizes Justice Black's
jot-for-jot incorporation approach as unduly restrictive, since it
would exclude both important textual freedoms like the writ of
habeas corpus and other nontextual liberties." Black's me-
chanical incorporation approach, however, not only reflected
54. The evidence makes this quite plausible. See generally Lash, supra note 20.
55. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 174.
56. See id. at 174-75.
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Black's view of history,' it also represented Black's assess-
ment of the limited power of the Court to discover nontextual
rights. It reflected, in other words, Black's repudiation of
"Lochnering."58 Amar argues that Black's fears of unlimited
judicial interference with the political process were unwarrant-
ed: Even if "privileges or immunities" include nontextual rights,
those nontextual freedoms may prohibit nothing more than
irrational discrimination.59
The ghost of Lochner v. New York," however, is not so easi-
ly interred. Although Amar gives but passing attention to this
bane of substantive due process, reconciling incorporation doc-
trine with the lessons of the New Deal is critical to the ques-
tion of political legitimacy. Even if the evidence supports
Amar's general thesis regarding incorporated textual rights, if
his method of refined incorporation opens the door to unwar-
ranted judicial intervention in the political process, then we are
no better off than we were before: de facto incorporation by way
of unjustifiable doctrine. The Court has always known this.61
Certainly Justice Black did.6"
Again, Amar seeks to minimize concerns regarding Lochner
by suggesting that nontextual privileges or immunities might
receive no more than low level nondiscrimination protection.
Even if one limits nontextual rights to nondiscrimination
norms, however, this does not avoid the problem of Lochner.
Lochner itself invoked the rights of business owners to not be
subject to laws that discriminated in favor of employees in
contract negotiations.' In fact, it is possible to argue that
57. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 app. (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
58. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 178.
59. See id.; see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. Witness the Court's long-standing tradition of criticizing the Lochner approach.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760-61 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (plurality opinion); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481 (1965); American Fed. of Labor v. American Sash Door Co., 335 U.S. 538,
543 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 81-83
(1947) (Black, J. dissenting).
62. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 82 (Black, J., dissenting) (linking nontextual sub-
stantive due process to the error of Lochner).
63. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 (striking down a New York law limiting
the number of hours bread makers could work on a daily and weekly basis). Almost
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Lochner itself was based upon Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection and due process principles in its strong protection of
freedom of contract without government interference.' After
all, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressly protected freedom of
contract.' If anything, refined incorporation seems to justify
Lochner's nontextual substantive due process analysis. If Amar
is right, i.e., if privileges or immunities do in fact include
nontextual freedoms, then it appears that the Lochner Court
was on the right track, even if it reached the wrong result in
that particular case.66
One could, of course, deny that "Lochnering" is a problem. If
the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause meant it to
embrace nontextual liberties (derived either by natural law or
historical pedigree), then concerns over Lochner may be dis-
missed as yet another example of under-appreciating the impact
of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment. Along with
most academics and Supreme Court justices, however, Amar
has the fear of Lochner in his blood. He legitimizes the concern
about nontextual substantive due process even as he explains
why his theory poses little threat of the Court returning to the
bad old days of pre-1937. Presumably his reasons have nothing
to do with the history behind the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' That Clause seems
tailor-made for the recognition of nontextual fundamental free-
doms. Moreover, as Amar points out, the Fourteenth Amend-
any fundamental right can be described (and protected) in equal protection terms.
Nontextual liberties that could be described as involving equal protection concerns
include abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality arguing
that access to abortion facilitates women's equal participation in the marketplace),
assisted suicide, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (1996), rev'd 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (circuit
court striking down ban on assisted suicide as violation of equal protection), sexual
orientation, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (state constitutional amendment
banning homosexual antidiscrimination laws violates the Equal Protection Clause),
and disability, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (strik-
ing down ordinance requiring special use permit as applied against a home for the
mentally retarded). The laws struck down in Romer and Cleburne failed to satisfy the
lowest level of judicial scrutiny, "rational basis review."
64. Bruce Ackerman develops this point regarding the legitimacy of Lochner. See
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 100-01.
65. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
66. Whether the result reached in Lochner is "wrong" or not is debatable.
67. Certainly Amar cites no evidence regarding the intentions of the Reconstruc-
tion Congress regarding nontextual "privileges or immunities." Amar does refer the
reader, however, to the work of John Harrison without actually embracing Harrison's
theory as his own. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 178.
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ment seems to signal a popular intent to expand the powers of
federal judges (if only to protect the rights of individuals
against racist southern juries). Far from reflecting nineteenth-
century concerns, the sense that Lochner represents judicial
error has its roots in a constitutional restructuring that oc-
curred in the late 1930s-a restructuring described in the
fourth footnote of an otherwise prosaic 1938 case involving the
regulation of filled milk."
Prior to 1937, the Supreme Court had struck down
Congress's efforts to regulate the economy as beyond the scope
of the Commerce Clause,69 and struck down state attempts to
do the same on the basis of the nontextual freedom of con-
tract.' Following the famous "switch in time,"'" however, the
Supreme Court rapidly reversed countless prior cases and an-
nounced a new rule of judicial deference towards government
commercial and social welfare legislation. In the midst of this
new presumption of constitutionality, the Court dropped a foot-
note in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 2 suggesting
that some kinds of legislation might still receive heightened
scrutiny. According to footnote four, the Court would closely
scrutinize legislation which "appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."3
It is no accident that footnote four speaks of heightened scru-
tiny for legislation that falls "within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution."4 This limitation would prevent what many
viewed as the primary error of Lochner: the Court's willingness
68. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
69. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down federal
attempt to regulate the price of coal as well as wages and hours for minors);
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
70. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71. In 1937, Justice Roberts abandoned his earlier opposition to New Deal leg-
islation and voted to uphold a state minimum wage regulation. See West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). His shift was dubbed "the switch in time that
saved nine" since it turned the tide against President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the
Court with pro-New Deal justices. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT.
203-04 (Kermit C. Hall ed., 1992).
72. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
73. Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
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to discover nontextual fundamental liberties lurking behind the
Constitution's broad guaranties of liberty and due process. In
the incorporated rights cases that followed the New Deal trans-
formation, the Court was careful to justify its decision as not
based on the "vague" contours of due process, but rather on the
more "specific" textual provisions incorporated against the
states. 75
The judicial focus on textual specifics highlights the flip side
of the New Deal Revolution. Although the Court's change of
course signaled a dramatic expansion of government regulatory
power, equally dramatic was the Court's renunciation of
"Lochnering" and its promise to link future interpretation of lib-
erty to rights having a textual home. The point is not one of
"specific meaning." As others have pointed out, there is nothing
inherently more "specific" about "establishment of religion" than
"due process."76 Instead, the point is one of legitimacy and
popular sovereignty. Maximizing the relationship between judi-
cial intervention and textual mandate enhances the Court's role
as guardian of the people's will and limits both the possibility
and public perception of judicial adventurism.77 Thus, when
Amar suggests the possibility of nontextual privileges or immu-
nities, he resurrects the ghost of Lochner. Not because this is
an incorrect reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, but because
it contradicts the Court's implicit twentieth-century promise not
to interfere with the political process without a clear constitu-
tional mandate to do so.78
75. See generally West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ("Much of
the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of
the First become its standard.").
76. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 122.
77. Obviously, for the promise of specificity to have any bite, there would have to
be some kind of limit on the level of generality used to describe the incorporated
right. Setting that level presumably would involve determining the level intended by
those who framed and ratified the right. In the case of the Bill of Rights, this inqui-
ry would focus on "privileges or immunities" as they were understood in 1868.
78. Although footnote four also speaks of protecting nontextual rights like the
right to vote, this makes sense in light of the Court's deferral to the political process.
See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 ("It is unnecessary to consider now
whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation."). The right to vote, moreover, is
implicit in a number of express constitutional provisions, including the Republican
Guarantee Clause, as well as the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth,
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There are other ways to look at Carolene Products and foot-
note four. For example, one could view footnote four's emphasis
on textual "specifics" as unduly restrictive, and justify protect-
ing nontextual rights like privacy as the proper means of pro-
tecting Fourteenth Amendment liberty in the face of the (consti-
tutionally) expanded powers of the modern activist state. 9
This approach, of course, presumes the constitutional legitimacy
of the New Deal expansion of federal power. For example, if the
New Deal was illegitimate, rolling back the New Deal seems a
more obvious solution than invoking nontextual liberties. On
the other hand, if the New Deal did not really expand power,
but merely restored the "original vision" of the Founders, then
there is no textual or historical justification for revising the
scope of individual liberty beyond that envisioned by the Found-
ers. In sum, whether the embrace of nontextual rights is an
appropriate response to the New Deal depends on one's view of
the legitimacy and scope of the New Deal.'o
and Twenty-sixth Amendments.
79. See 1 ACKEMiAN, supra note 6, at 158. Ackerman acknowledges the tension
between the nontextual right of privacy and the "specifics" language of footnote four,
but raises the possibility that nontextual rights may be a preferable way to synthe-
size the Constitution's protection of liberty under the Founding, Reconstruction and
New Deal constitutions. See id. Ackerman does not, however, expressly resolve the
issue. See id. at 159 ("[M]y aim here has been to begin a story, not to end it."). In
We the People: Transformations, Ackerman suggests that the Reagan and Bush Ad-
ministrations attempted to overrule Roe as a failed "constitutional moment." See 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 398-99 (1998). Ackerman thus
both grants the right to privacy constitutional status and implies that the legitimacy
of Roe and the right to privacy is intimately connected to the constitutional status of
the New Deal. See id. at 402 ("[T]he Supreme Court of the 1930s was called upon to
confront a contestable question of judgment: Was the bankruptcy of Lochner's juris-
prudence 'unmistakable to most people?' This was also the ultimate question in 1992
when the status of Roe, and the constitutional world that made it legally plausible,
was called before the bar."). Ackerman has not expressly repudiated the option of
embracing the New Deal and footnote four, while rejecting the concept of nontextual
fundamental liberties, though he may do so in the future. See id. at 403 ("My next
volume, Interpretations, will try to clarify the judicial challenges that lie ahead.").
80. Additionally, one might argue that the thrust of Carolene Products was to re-
serve close judicial scrutiny of personal liberties, textual or nontextual. Under this
view, footnote fours reference to the Bill of Rights is meant as an example of per-
sonal liberties, and not intended to foreclose protection of nontextual personal liber-
ties. This approach not only downplays the Court's use of the word "specific," it also
cannot account for the New Deal Coures concern with linking the "vague" protection
of due process with clear textual mandates. Even if this approach is correct, however,
it still requires taking a position on the New Deal. After all, protection of property
rights and liberty of contract are examples of "personal rights" just as much as
speech, religion, and privacy. Excluding the former, while retaining the latter as "fun-
damental rights," requires one to give the New Deal revolution constitutional status.
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Interestingly, it is here that the myth of the "big bang" may
play an important-and constitutional-role. One might criticize
the Court for unpersuasively grounding its post-New Deal inter-
pretation of federal power on the intentions of the Founders."1
One can also agree with Amar that focusing solely on the
Founding obscures the vital contributions of Reconstruction
Republicans in the cause of individual liberty. Yet, however
erroneous as a matter of history, post-New Deal preoccupation
with textual specifics and original intent may reflect a
legitimate response to the People's will.82 If the New Deal was
in fact a constitutional moment, that moment seems to have
involved a modification of the modes of judicial interpretation
as much as it involved a reevaluation of government power. Put
another way, the modern tendency to ground judicial opinions
on original intent may reflect not so much the will of the
Founders as the will of "We the People" of the twentieth
century.
Developing the idea that the New Deal has constitutional
implications for judicial review deserves much more space than
I can devote to it here, and I plan to provide a full treatment
of the issue in a future article. Some points, however, are worth
mentioning in light of Amar's invitation to look beyond the
original intent of the Founders. First, by seriously considering
the procedural impact of the New Deal, the debate over
originalism 8 shifts from an argument about the Founders' in-
81. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (citing for support,
Marshalrs opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). Marshall left open the door to judi-
cial invalidation of Acts of Congress using an enumerated power as a pretext for
regulating an area outside of their proper responsibilities. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) ("[Slhould Congress, under the pretext of execut-
ing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the gov-
ernment; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the
land."). The New Deal Court, however, expressly rejected this kind of judicial inquiry
into the motives of Congress. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)
("Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe
some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress
by the Commerce Clause.").
82. By analogy, if the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment erroneously as-
cribed libertarian views to the Founders, this should not affect the scope of the lib-
erties they meant to protect against state action.
83. There are various forms of originalist interpretation. For the purposes of this
essay, I refer to any theory of constitutional interpretation that grounds current
meaning (in whole or in part) on the views or expectations of those who framed,
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tent to the intent of "We the People" circa 1937. A common
criticism of originalist theories of constitutional interpretation is
that they were not embraced by the original Founders them-.
selves.' Why should we embrace originalism if Madison did
not?
It may turn out that the modem emphasis on the original
intentions of the Founders is justified by a modem restructur-
ing of the Constitution. Indeed, in the nineteenth century, when
law was a brooding omnipresence waiting to be discovered by
judges, it may have made perfect sense to proceed as Amar
tells us the "Barron-contrarians" did: by consulting not just the
text of the Bill of Rights, but also the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the English Bill of Rights, as well as the writings of
Blackstone and other great legal scholars. Placing that kind of
discretion into the hands of non-elected judges, however, seems
ill suited for a century marked by the rise of legal realism and
the legal canonization of the victory of the political branches
over a recalcitrant Supreme Court. Put another way, the old
wine of nineteenth-century interpretive methods should not be
poured into the new wine skin of post-New Deal constitution-
alism. Given the modern acceptance of competing interpreta-
tions of liberty, it may be that resolving the meaning of such a
vague term is best left in the hands of the people and their
representatives. This, of course, was the point of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's dissents during the Lochner period -dis-
adopted, or ratified the text.
84. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS:" ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY (1972); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985); Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987).
85. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
think that the word qiberty,' in the Fourteenth Amendment, is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that
a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law."); see also Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930)
(Holmes, J. dissenting) ("I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety
that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cut-
ting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the deci-
sions now stand I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights
if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I
cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody
our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions.").
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sents expressly and implicitly invoked by the Court during its
post-New Deal reinterpretation of due process.' Under the
modem approach, removing a matter from the political process
requires sufficient evidence of the people's desire to immunize
the subject from majoritarian control." Such evidence would
include either the text, or in the case of contested textual inter-
pretations, evidence of the intended scope of the text.
Originalism is the search for intended meaning.
Secondly, viewing Amar's "privileges or immunities" through
the lens of the New Deal creates the ironic possibility that
justifying nonenumerated rights requires de-legitimizing the
constitutional status of the New Deal.' Most constitutional
scholars consider the New Deal expansion of government power
and the modern Court's embrace of nonenumerated rights to be
two sides of the same judicial coin. Those opposed to nonenu-
merated rights are more likely to oppose the Court's broad
interpretation of federal power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause. Those in favor of one are more likely to be in favor of
the other. In fact, however, there is reason to think these doc-
trines are not twins, but opposites. For if the Court's approach
to the New Deal reflected a legitimate constitutional change,
then this creates the possibility that the rejection of
"Lochnering" was itself part of that constitutional change. On
the other hand, if the New Deal was either illegitimate, or not
reflective of a change in constitutional structure, then this
86. See, e.g., Furguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963); State Tax Comm'n v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 183 (1942). Holmes's dissent appears to track the current
Court's limitation of fundamental liberties to those either mentioned in the text of
the Constitution or "deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions." See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997). It could be that both foot-
note four and Holmes's famous dissent play a role in understanding "New Deal Due
Process."
87. According to Justice Jackson, "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943). Notice how Jackson grounds judicial interference with the political
process to both the text of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) and the intentions of
those who adopted the text. Jackson's opinion is a masterpiece of judicial analysis of
the scope and impact of the New Deal, and it deserves a deeper analysis than I can
provide here. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 317 (1992) (discussing the importance of Jackson's opinion in understanding the
scope of the New Deal).




takes the constitutional sting out of footnote four and the rejec-
tion of nontextual substantive due process. Regardless of one's
ultimate position, considering the impact of the New Deal
seems to require rethinking commonly held assumptions regard-
ing the legitimacy of the modern regulatory state and the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For his part, Amar downplays the importance of the New
Deal and self-consciously distances himself from "Ackermanian"
theories of constitutional moments."9 According to Amar, treat-
ing the New Deal as an amendment is problematic given that
the revolution left no textual trace in the Constitution.' ° As an
alternative, Amar tentatively suggests that the New Deal ex-
pansion of federal power might be justified under the combined
impact of the "progressive" amendments of the first decades of
the twentieth century. For example, twentieth-century amend-
ments like the Sixteenth (progressive income tax),9 Seven-
teenth (election of Senators),92 and Nineteenth (women's right
to vote)93 collectively contain themes of nationalism and eco-
nomic redistribution-major themes of the New Deal.' Al-
though he declines to expressly take a position, Amar suggests
that these amendments in themselves might justify the Court's
expansion of government power to enact economic and social
welfare legislation.95
Even if we accept such a broad interpretation of these
amendments, 6 this kind of interpretative approach seems to
undermine Amar's analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. If
we can take the Progressive amendments at such a high level
of generality, and use that generality to justify reversing prior
interpretations of the Constitution, then there seems to be little
89. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 299.
90. See id. at 300.
'91. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
92. Id. amend. XVII.
93. Id. amend. XIX.
94. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 300.
95. See id.
96. Ackerman describes these amendments as "super-statutes" and not expressions
of major constitutional change. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 91 ('Superstatutes
do not try to revise any of the deeper principles organizing our higher law; they
content themselves with changing one or more rules without challenging anything
more basic."). Ackerman also argues that footnote four's emphasis on specifics treats
the Fourteenth Amendment "as a superstatute containing 'specific prohibitions' with
fixed and relatively straightforward meanings." Id. at 157.
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need for Amar's exhaustive textual and historical treatment of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Presumably, the three
great Reconstruction amendments could be read as expressing
"greater nationalism" and "greater individual liberty" to an
extent sufficient to justify incorporation and reinterpretation of
the original Bill of Rights. Indeed, if the Progressive-Era
amendments can be read to contain the seeds of a remarkable
expansion of federal power, it is at least as plausible that the
Fourteenth Amendment contained the seeds of Lochner and
prohibition of government interference with economic individ-
ualism (a subject directly tied to the crucible of events sur-
rounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment). In the
end, it would take an exhaustive investigation of the Progres-
sive amendments-on par with Amar's treatment of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment-before we can deter-
mine whether those amendments constitute the power source
for the modem regulatory state.
For now, the only constitutional scholar seriously investigat-
ing the constitutional significance of the early twentieth century
is Bruce Ackerman and his investigation of the New Deal. If
Ackerman is correct, if the New Deal was indeed a constitution-
al moment, then there are some intriguing implications for
what constitutes modem "privileges or immunities." Amar's
refined incorporation theory assumes that the same set of
words can take on new constitutional meanings when placed in
a new constitutional context.' But if this is so, then just as
the Bill of Rights cannot be understood apart from a proper
understanding of Reconstruction, so too the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be understood apart from a proper under-
standing of the New Deal.9" There is nothing radical about
this. Most legal scholars, Amar included, recognize that the
rules of judicial engagement changed in the late 1930s. The
Supreme Court continues to grapple with the problems of
Lochner to this day.' Ultimately, until we have come to terms
97. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 224-25.
98. The impact of the New Deal would extend to textual, as well as nontextual
rights. For example, legitimizing federal control of commercial matters may have an
impact on the freedom of commercial speech. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997). It might also justify increased protection of other
textual liberties against the inevitable onslaught of the modem regulatory state.
99. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2279 (1997) (Souter, J.
concurring); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
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with the legitimacy and scope of the New Deal Revolution, the
constitutional symphony Amar has described so beautifully in
The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction will remain
unfinished.
ing); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992) (plurality opinion); Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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